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CHAPTER 21 
Conflict of Laws 
MONROE INKER 
§21.1. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Keen~ 
v. Toth 1 is the first case in which the Supreme Judicial Court has dis-
cussed the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.2 This 
act, the purpose of which is "to provide an effective procedure to com-
pel performance by a person who is under a duty to support depend-
ents in another state," a has been adopted by all of the forty-eight 
states.40 
In this case the petitioner sought contribution towards the support 
of their two children domiciled with her in Virginia, from respondent, 
their father domiciled in Massachusetts. The petition and evidence 
were properly certified to the District Court of Northern Norfolk by 
the initiating court in Virginia. The District Court made a support 
order. On appeal, the Appellate Division order dismissing petitioner's 
report was affirmed. 
The decision in Keen~ v. Toth is significant because of the choice ot 
law made by the Court in determining the respondent's duty of sup-
port. The Court said, "In the present case Virginia is the initiating 
State, and this Commonwealth is the responding State. For our pur-
poses we need consider only the law of this Commonwealth." II The 
Court's only too brief discussion of its choice of law is regrettable; 
however, the choice made by the Court is eminently sound. Under the 
prior conflict of law rules in support cases, the enforceable duties were 
those imposed by the state of residence of the one owing the duty of 
support.6 
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merly taught at Harvard University and at Northeastern University School of Law. 
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§21.1. 1335 Mass. 591, 141 N.E.2d 509 (1957). For further comment on this 
case, see §19.7 supra. 
2 G.L., c. 27M. 
3335 Mass. 591, 593, 141 N.E.2d 509, 510 (1957). 
40 For an excellent discussion of the act, see Cheatam, Goodrich, Griswold and 
Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 848 (4th ed. 1957). See also Note, 
17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 261 (1956). 
II 335 Mass. 591, 594, 141 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1957). 
CI Commonwealth v. Acker, 197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312 (1908). See Stimson, Simpli-
fying the Conflict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for Enactment by Congress, 116 A.B.A.]. 
1003 (1950). 
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§21.2 CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 
The Uniform Act provides: "Duties of Support enforceable under 
this chapter are those imposed under the laws of any state in which 
the alleged obligor was present during the period for which support 
is sought or in which the obligee was present when the failure to sup-
port commenced." '1 The author of a law review note, after discussing 
the history and meaning of this section, has stated: "Thus the question 
of which law should be applied when the obligor has been present in 
more than one state during the period for which support is sought re-
mains open. This would seem to suggest that in such cases the deter-
mination of which law should govern is to be left to the courts of the 
responding state." 8 In the Keene case the Court selected Massachu-
setts law as determining respondent's duty of support. This would seem 
to be in accordance with the intent of the draftsman of the act.9 
In this case the Court was careful to point out that the question be-
fore it "is that of the power of the District Court to make a valid 
order prospective in operation based upon a duty of support owed by 
the respondent to his children, who are in Virginia." 10 
§21.2. Valid foreign contracts: Enforcement in Massachusetts. In 
Prahl v. Prahl l the wife filed a petition for separate support in the 
Probate Court together with a petition to enforce a separation agree-
ment which she and her husband had entered into in Connecticut 
where bo·th were then domiciled. Under the law of Connecticut 2 such 
an agreement is valid and legally enforceable at the instance of the 
wife. The Probate Court's dismissal of the petition of the wife to 
enforce the Connecticut agreement was affirmed by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court. Although it was conceded that the contract was valid in 
Connecticut and therefore valid in Massachusetts, the Court held that 
there is no equity jurisdiction in the Probate Courts to enforce a con-
cededly valid contract between husband and wife. 
Although the Court follows the rule that the validity of a foreign 
agreement is to be determined by the law of the place of making,8 it 
will not always enforce a valid foreign contract. As the Court stated 
'1 C.L., c. 27M, §4. 
8 Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 14!l5, 14!l6 (1954). 
9 Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1480, 1482 (1954). See State of New York Joint Legis-
lature Committee on Interstate Cooperation, Summary of Conference on Social 
Welfare and Non-Support 5, item 11 (July, 195!l), where it was said: "One of the 
most extensively discussed questions was that of the applicable suppon duty •.• 
Professor Brockelbank has explained that the [1952] Uniform Act contemplates 
presence of the obligor as the controlling factor. In other words, if the obligor is 
present in the responding state and a prospective support order is sought, then the 
support duties set forth in the responding state shall control. On the other hand 
if the obligor was present in the initiating state in the past, and an order for ar-
rearages is sought, then the initiating state's support requirements would control." 
10 !l!l5 Mass. 591, 59!l, 141 N.E.2d 509, 510 (1957). 
§21.2. 1 !l35 Mass. 483, 140 N.E.2d 480 (1957). 
2 Conn. Gen. Stat., c. !l66, §7!l07. 
a Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. !l74 (1878). 
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in Emery v. Burbank, "a contract valid where it is made is valid every-
where, but it is not necessarily enforceable everywhere." 4 Enforcement 
has been refused on policy grounds II and, as in the present case, for 
lack of jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. 
All of the cases discussed above and all relied on by the Court and 
cited by the parties in the Prahl case were decided before Hughes v. 
Fetter.6 In the Hughes case the plaintiff brought suit in Wisconsin to 
enforce a claim under an Illinois wrongful death statute. A Wisconsin 
statute forbade the enforcement of foreign death claims. Relying on 
the Wisconsin statute, the Wisconsin court dismissed the action. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin decision and held 
that Wisconsin's refusal to enforce a claim under an Illinois wrongful 
death statute violated the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court said: 
It is also settled that Wisconsin cannot escape this constitutional 
obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under 
the laws of other states by the simple device of removing jurisdic-
tion from courts otherwise competent. We have recognized, how-
ever, that full faith and credit does not automatically compel a 
forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting 
public act of another state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in 
each case between the competing public policies involved.7 
While Prahl v. Prahl may be distinguished from Hughes v. Fetter, 
the Court should, in the light of the Hughes case, re-examine its poli-
cies underlying refusal to enforce foreign causes of action. 
§21.3. Security transactions: Choice of law. In Budget Plan, Inc. 
v. Sterling A. Orr, Inc.1 the plaintiff automobile agency, O'Meara 
Motors, and its assignee, Budget Plan, brought an action of replevin to 
recover an automobile in the possession of the defendant. Under an 
agreement of conditional sale executed in Connecticut the plaintiff 
agency sold an automobile then in Connecticut to Smith, a resident of 
Massachusetts. Smith removed the automobile to Massachusetts where 
it was eventually bought by the defendant who in the words of the 
Court was an "innocent purchaser." 2 In order to prevail, the plaintiffs 
had to prove that the conditional sales agreement was valid. The trial 
judge found that the law of Connecticut determined the validity of 
the conditional sales agreement and that the conditional vendor had 
not satisfied Connecticut law concerning acknowledgment of condi-
tional sales agreements.s He also found that the plaintiffs' failure to 
4163 Mass. 326, 327, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895). 
II Greengood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358 (1810). 
6341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951). 
7341 U.S. at 611, 7I Sup. Ct. at 982, 95 L. Ed. at 1216. 
§21.!1. 1334 Mass. 599, 137 N.E.2d 918 (1956). For further discussion of this 
case, see §18.4 supra. 
2334 Mass. at 600, 137 N.E.2d at 919. 
S Conn. Gen. Stat., c. 310, §6692. 
3
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acknowledge made the conditional sales agreement invalid. His deci-
sion for the defendant was affirmed on appeal. 
The significance of lhe decision in lhis case lies not in the Court's 
examination of the law of Connecticut but in the Court's brief discus-
sion of the law governing the validity of a conditional sales agreement. 
The great use of conditional sales agreements in the sale of many 
chattels, particularly automobiles, has given rise to many choices of 
law problems. 
The problem which is presented with the greatest frequency con-
cerns the ability of a seller, who has reserved title under a condi-
tional sale or has taken a mortgage, to enforce his claims with 
respect to the chattel against a third person, such as a purchaser 
or an attaching or execution creditor, who has dealt with the 
property as that of the buyer after its removal to another state. 
But security transactions create legal relations between the im-
mediate parties, and questions can also arise as to the proper law 
to control in this respect.4 
Prior to its decision in the Budget Plan case the Court has, as in 
Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., stated its rule as 
follows: "The rule is that the nature, validity, and interpretation of 
a contract are to be governed by the law of the place where it is 
made." 5 The decision in the Jewett case and the use of the place-of-
making theory in cases involving conditional sales agreements and 
chattel securities had been criticized.6 In the main, the criticism of 
the place-of-making rule has centered on its failure to take into account 
the law of situs of the chattel which is the subject of the conditional 
sales agreement or chattel mortgage. 
In the Budget Plan case the Court recognized this criticism of the 
Jewett case and in what is pure dictum destroyed much of the force of 
that case. The Court said: "In the Jewett case ... the contract of con-
ditional sale was made in Massachusetts, and the property delivered 
in New Hampshire. It was held by a divided court that the rights of 
the parties in the property were governed by the law of Massachusetts. 
This, it seems, is contrary to the prevailing view." 7 
The Court, however, pointed out that the Budget Plan case is dis-
tinguishable from the Jewett case since here both the conditional sales 
agreement and delivery of the auto were made in Connecticut. Thus, 
4 Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 Iowa L. 
Rev. 528 (1942). 
Ii 282 Mass. 469, 475, 185 N.E. 369, 371 (1933). 
6 See Decisions, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 1061 (1933), II N.Y.V.L. Rev. 281 (1933). 
7334 Mass. 599, 601n, 137 N.E.2d 918, 920n (1956). The Court cited the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws §272; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws §157 (3d ed. 1949); 
and the cases cited in the dissenting opinion of the Jewett case, 282 Mass. 469, 479, 
185 N.E. 369, 372-373 (1933). The Court then further stated: "Whether if the 
automobile in the case at bar had been in Massachusetts when the sale was made, 
we would hold that the parties' rights would, nevertheless, be governed by the law 
of Connecticut, in accordance with the rule of the Jewett case, need not be decided." 
4
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" ... the question whether the sale was effective to enable the vendor 
to retain title is to be determined by the law of that State." 8 
Since the Court said that it was still undecided about the problem 
posed in the Jewett case, the effect of the decision in the Budget Plan 
case is difficult to determine. The Court, however, by its consideration 
of the situs of the chattel at the time of the making of the conditional 
sales agreement, is receding from an application of the strict place-of-
making rule. This is a welcome change. Professor Stumberg has stated: 
... a criticism which could be made of an inflexible rule which 
would require that the law of the place of making control the legal 
relations of the immediate parties to a security transaction is that 
controlling effect might be given the law of a particular state 
merely because of the accidental consummation of the contract 
there when the purposes of the transaction have only a remote 
connection with that state.1I 
But Stumberg's criticism of the choice of law made by the Court in 
the Budget Plan case should also be noted: 
The same objection could be made to a rule which would arbi-
trarily call for the application of the law in force at the situs of 
the chattel at the time of the consummation of the transaction. 
The most reasonable solution would seem to be to give effect to 
the law of the state where the chattel is to be habitually used, 
whenever both parties contemplate its use in some particular state, 
since that is the place with which the security transaction and the 
obligations which it may create have the most substantial connec-
tion.l0 
§21.4. Divisible divorce: Effect on duty to support. In Vanderbilt 
v. Vanderbilt 1 a Nevada ex parte decree of divorce was imposed as a 
bar to a wife's action for separation and alimony under the New York 
Civil Practice Act.2 The husband obtained the divorce in June, 195~, 
and the wife initiated the separation and alimony action one year after 
moving to New York in February, 1953. The Nevada divorce was held 
to bar the suit for separation but to have no effect on the wife's alimony 
claim under New York law,1I the United States Supreme Court holding 
8334 Mass. 599, 600·601, 137 N.E.2d 918, 920 (1956). 
II Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 Iowa L. 
Rev. 528, 535·536 (1942). 
10Id. at 536. See Beggs v. Bartels, 73 Conn. 132, 46 Atl. 874, 84 Am. St. Rep. 152 
(1900), which indicates that if the Budget Plan case had been brought in Connecti-
cut, that court would have applied Massachusetts law. 
§21.4. 1354 U.S. 416, 77 Sup. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1956). 
2 N.Y. Civil Practice Act §§lI65·a(3), lI71·a. 
II Id. §lI70.b, which provides: "In an action for ... separation ... where the court 
refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce ... 
had previously been granted to a husband in an action in which jurisdiction over 
the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the 
same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife." 
--", 
5
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that the "divisible divorce" concept enunciated in Estin v. Estin 4 was 
effectual to preserve a statutory "property right" not yet reduced to 
judgment despite the existence of a valid ex parte divorce. 
The VandeTbilt case is of but academic interest to the Massachusetts 
practitioner, for it is settled Massachusetts law that even pre-existing 
obligations to support lose their prospective effect upon the termina-
tion of the marital relation in a valid out-of-state proceeding.5 Massa-
chusetts also does not have a statute similar to the one in New York 
which conferred the alimony right in the Vanderbilt case.6 The deci-
sion may have importance in Massachusetts, however, since the Gen-
eral Court, if it wishes, may constitutionally enact legislation which 
will protect a resident from the poverty that often results from an out-
of-state ex parte divorce in which the resident receives no alimony or 
financial settlement. 
4334 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948); see Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 
1454 (1948). 
5 Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936). 
6 See note 3 supra. 
6
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